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Robert Leckey, ed.
Afer Legal Equality: Family, Sex, Kinship. London: Routledge, 2015, 224 pp.
In his thoughtful introduction to Afer Legal Equality, McGill law professor Robert
Leckey makes a strong case for the breadth and signifcance of the book’s titular theme.
“Research ‘afer legal equality,’” he writes, should explore “at least fve phenomena”:
1) the “dismantlement” of victories won “in the name of legal equality”; 2) other
types of “backlash”; 3) formal equality’s failure to engender “signifcant redistribution
or substantive equality”; 4) the “impact” of successful equality movements on groups
“lef behind or further disadvantaged”; and 5) egalitarian law reform’s sometimesregrettable efects on its “intended benefciaries” (3–4). Tis list is not (and does
not purport to be) exhaustive. For one thing, it focuses exclusively on the crueler
side of equality’s double edge.
Tat formal equality can have perverse consequences will not be news to readers
acquainted with civil rights history or with a number of critical traditions in legal
and political theory. Yet Afer Legal Equality refects a justifably “urgent sense that
law reforms driven by equality call for fresh lines of inquiry” (i). Te anthology is,
frst and foremost, an extended meditation on the afermath of two momentous
developments in certain countries’ regulation of sex, family, and kinship: the consolidation of gender-neutral norms governing parenting and cohabitation, and legal
recognition of same-sex conjugal relationships. Insofar as the latter is, as Leckey puts
it, the volume’s “prevalent site of investigation” (3), the collection constitutes an early
and important instance of academic reckoning with life “afer” gay marriage.1
Several contributors to Afer Legal Equality do an admirable job of illuminating the post-equality phenomena enumerated in Leckey’s introduction. Egalitarian
law reform’s potentially onerous “impact [on] those lef behind or further disadvantaged” (3) is neatly suggested by Rosie Harding’s account of gay marriage advocates’ exclusionary insistence on the dyadic and permanent nature of marital love.
Te distinction between formal and substantive equality is likewise illustrated in
Susan Boyd’s analysis of how British Columbia’s Family Law Act does and does not
mitigate the “uncomfortabl[e]” ft between sex-neutral rules and “familial realities
that remain stubbornly gendered” (42). (That distinction also underlies Janet
Jackobsen’s intriguing essay on “economic justice afer legal equality” (77), which
efectively proposes to “queer” the welfare state by making it more responsive to,
and supportive of, a range of care networks well beyond the nuclear family.)
“Dismantlement” and “backlash” (3), by contrast, appear only in passing, as when
Roderick Ferguson alludes to the US Supreme Court’s nearly simultaneous invalidations of key provisions of the Defense of Marriage and Voting Rights Acts.
This coincidence, which suggests to Ferguson homosexuality’s “mainstreaming …
via the marginalization of anti-racist protections” (159), lends urgency to his
1
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otherwise familiar argument that contemporary lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) advocacy obscures the radical and often-shared aspirations of
earlier movements for sexual and racial justice.
Context rather than content accounts for the novelty of several other contributions to After Legal Equality. Jonathan Herring, for instance, puts an avowedly
“mainstream” cast on Martha Fineman’s influential proposal that bonds of care
and dependence rather than sexual ties should underlie legal recognition of family
relationships (25). Claire Young’s chapter reafrms her own longstanding—and
powerful—objections to tax rules that encourage gendered divisions of marital
labor. Te message in both cases seems to be that, new or not, these are ideas whose
time has come. Catherine Donovan’s chapter is explicit in this regard. Reminding
us of the ill fit between gender-based theories of domestic violence and many
queer relationships, Donovan argues that, having secured equality for British
same-sex couples in terms of public recognition, “it is to equality in the intimate
sphere that our attention [now] should be turned” (168).
Thus a number of contributions to After Legal Equality draw our attention
back to problems that, unsurprisingly, legal equality has failed to solve. Tis is not
the same thing as describing law reform’s inadvertent consequences for “intended
benefciaries” (as Leckey’s introduction would have it) (4), but it is important work
nonetheless. Indeed, calls to resume or reinvigorate neglected or stagnant political
projects may constitute some of the most salient and ultimately liberating modes
of “research ‘afer legal equality.’” Witness Rose Harding’s def use of two English
cases, both involving lesbian couples and known sperm donors, to show that the
advent of gay marriage has hardly eradicated heterosexist conceptions of legal parenthood. Or take Daniel Monk’s superb piece on “sexuality and children postequality,” which ofers a non-monogamous same-sex couple’s stalled adoption bid
as evidence of the diference between ending discrimination based on sexual orientation and ending discrimination based on queer sexuality.
Two of Afer Legal Equality’s most compelling entries relate to the continued
inequality of married and unmarried couples. As Kim Brooks notes, both groups
may be treated as “spouses” under Canada’s Income Tax Act, but only the latter
must be able to prove that the material conditions of their lives entitle them to such
treatment. Using facts gleaned from cases of contested spousal status, Brooks presents a fascinating set of “cameos from the margins of conjugality” (99). Meanwhile
Helen Reece cleverly analyzes an unsuccessful British campaign to promote cohabitation agreements and disabuse citizens of the widespread misimpression that married and unmarried cohabitants are treated comparably when their relationships
end. Neither chapter quite describes a phenomenon named in Leckey’s ambitious
agenda for post-equality studies. Yet, like most other contributions to Afer Legal
Equality, both raise issues that merit some portion of the intellectual energy and
activist efort so long consumed by the fght for gay marriage.
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